The Twentieth Century Inheritance: Myths, Metaphors and a Metahistorical Imagination by Griffin, Michael
Religion, Literature and the Arts Project 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY INHERITANCE: 
MYTHS, METAPHORS AND A METAHISTORICAL 
IMAGINATION 
Michael Giffin 
In considering the dialogue between Religion, Literature and the Arts, we 
need to remind ourselves that ever since the philosophy of consciousness 
took the linguistic turn, whole schools of theory within the humanities 
have been dominated by rhetoric about language, about what language is as 
sign, as symbol and as sacrament, and what language can, or cannot convey 
about being and knowing. 
Jilrgen Habermas reminds us that this rhetoric began to evolve in the 
early nineteenth century,! and its enterprise can be described as 
'postmetaphysical' thinking. Since then the humanities have become 
Increasingly devoted to pitting the imagination against language, against 
society, against science and against religion. And yes, we hear about the 
longing for 'spirituality', but that is a longing for something other than the 
Western scientific, religious and metaphysical tradition. 
This longing for a new spirituality is intensely anti-intellectual, and 
the rhetoric that cries out for it is primarily conducted at the expense of what 
metaphysics and enlightenment are understood to be. 'Metaphysics' and 
'enlightenment' have become words that are interchangeable with Western 
'religion'. To give three examples, that come, ironically, from within the 
Church: 
1. At the first RLA Conference in 1994 I heard a paper given by an artist. He 
began by saying he was non-theoretical and non-academic. He was simply 
trying to express himself, to mediate truth as he saw it. Then he went on to 
declare that the purpose of his art was to 'overcome the dualism of mind 
and body which has dominated the Western imagination since the 
Enlightenment'. Non-theoretical indeed! 
2. A few weeks earlier I had made a guided retreat. It was guided by a 
laywoman who said she hoped the retreat would be challenging. After 
spending a few minutes negotiating her humility and her lack of 
intellectual prowess, she launched into a diatribe. She told us quite clearly 
and emphatically that the problem facing Western Christians was how to 
heal the damage caused by the split created by Cartesian 
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epistemology. Those were her own humble and non-intellectual words, and 
I thought they laid a lot upon the retreatants. 
3. Last week I got a flier from Eremos which advertised another of their 
workshops. This workshop was similar to most Eremos offerings. The flier 
read HEALING THE MIND/BODY SPLIT and it asked two rhetorical 
questions: The first, 'Why do we see the body and spirit as two rather than 
one?' and the second, 'Why is this a struggle in our individual lives and in 
the culture? [sic)'. It was announced that these questions would be explored, 
through lecture and performance, by two 'body theologians' from the West 
Coast of the United States. 
These people - the artist, the retreat conductor and the 'body 
theologians' - think they are on to something important and new, but they 
are not. They are merely flagellating the Enlightenment by tapping into a 
Postmetaphysical discourse that is now two hundred years old. It is a 
discourse that has run through Romanticism, Modernity and 
Postmodernity, and is now disappearing into the New Age movement. This 
highlights the problem facing those who want to explore the relationship 
between Religion, Literature and the Arts in the next century. For whether 
we are creating or interpreting, we cannot simply mouth tired rhetoric. 
Neither can we ignore the sciences and remain walled up in a little cul-de-
sac within the humanities. 
The problem is that the varieties of Postmetaphysical thinking have 
been good at describing the imaginary problems of the individual and 
society, as if the description is a sufficient end in itself. Yet in practical terms 
the description does not help if the problem is not imaginary. To give but 
one example: Michel Foucault suggests that society is a system which is 
inscribed, and so realities such as psychiatric illness occur only because they 
are socially determined. Therefore psychiatric hospitals are filled with 
patil!nts for no other reason than society has described madness and 
prescribed institutional control. Metaphysics and the Enlightenment are 
blamed for all those psychiatric illnesses which Foucault suggests are socially 
determined. Apparently, as illnesses they have nothing to do with genetics, 
biology or chemistry, and healing occurs when the imaginary problem is 
addressed 'holistically' rather than 'dualistically'. Propositions do not come 
any more gratuitous that this, and the example of Foucault and psychiatric 
illness demonstrates just how much some parts of the humanities have 
become divorced from a real world that is not imaginary. 
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The proposition that metaphysics and the Enlightenment can be 
blamed for the imaginary dualism of mind and body, and consequently for 
all illness and institution, is both illiterate and illogical unless it can be 
demonstrated and substantiated. And yet the glibness which creates this 
scapegoat, which places being and reality wholly within the construct of 
human imagination, language and society, is a glibness which is at the very 
centre of a great deal of current theory and practice. In some circles the 
theorist who is trained in arts, linguistics and literature has become the 
twentieth-century shaman and prophet, struggling to heal the Western 
imagination which has been metaphorically damaged by metaphysics and 
the Enlightenment. Of course that is perfectly alright until one needs a 
colostomy or a by-pass, then one moves on from therapy, and art, and goes 
to a real doctor. 
This realm of Postmetaphysical thinking is the overarching discourse 
in which Romanticism, Modernity and Postmodernity subsist. While the 
religious theorist understands these discourses as theological, the secular 
theorist appropriates the same discourses as anti-religious in a general sense 
that intends to erase both Judaism and Christianity as religions. The secular 
mind has not been able to grasp the fact that Western religion is not 
reducible to a narrow definition of metaphysics. 
For when Postmetaphysical thinking began to encourage psychological 
introspection, and began to proclaim the death of God and questioning all 
other external or metaphysical constructs, it was advancing a theological 
speculation. This is such an obvious fact that it seems hard to believe that 
the secular mind, however perceptive or intelligent, has overlooked or 
dismissed it in the effort to demonstrate that the religious personality must 
be either naive or dis-integrated. To the secular Western mind religion is 
the aetiology of illness. Religion is a psychological problem. Sadly, many 
'religious' people agree. 
The Postmetaphysical interrogation of reason and enlightenment, the 
interrogation of metaphysics, has focussed upon language as a deep (but 
increasingly unreliable) structure of myth and metaphor. In such a 
theoretical scheme language is still, and always will be, a horizon that needs 
to be transcended and overcome. So here Modernity and Postmodernity, the 
inspiration of so much literature, music and art, have not been able to 
separate being from language. 
So whatever the serious twentieth-century artist and writer wants to 
170 
1996 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 
say about being and knowing is always, in some way, a comment about 
language or silence. The crisis of the Western imagination is supposed to be, 
not only a crisis of language, but a crisis caused by language. Of course the 
proposition of language-as-horizon may well be absolute and true - we dare 
not try to argue against that - but the more extravagant cosmological, 
paradigmatic and psychoanalytical claims levelled against language are 
becoming less and less grounded in that real world which exists outside of 
interpretive theory. And such a real world does exist, for when we discover 
a lump we do not theorise about the need for paradigm shift, we go to the 
doctor and see what the lump is. And we hope it can be treated. 
Still, the proposition of language-as-horizon continues to be widely 
held within the humanities, as it has been ever since the early Moderns 
began interrogating being and language. The idea continues to inform a 
great deal of creative practice and interpretive theory within a tradition that 
is still telling us evil is imaginatively located within the myths and 
metaphors of Western language. Postmetaphysical wisdom tells us that the 
metaphysical and logocentric imagination of the Western mind is 
obliterating and annihilating because it is always attempting to reconcile an 
imaginary separation of signifier and signified. You see, it's all to do with 
the Greeks, with Plato and Aristotle, who created psychic disunity, the 
separation and fragmentation of personality. Dualism is ascribed to Athens, 
described as Greek mythology, inscribed within Greek language. Disease, or 
dis-ease, is produced by the civilisation that imagines time as linear, and has 
a language with subjects and objects, and definite and indefinite articles. Evil 
is encoded in the sentence: The cat sat on the mat. 
It remains to be seen just how long the philosophy of consciousness 
can keep on taking this linguistic turn without losing direction. Ever since 
Heidegger uttered the dictum 'the metaphorical exists only within the 
metaphysical', the new rhetoricians have been treating the idea as a radically 
given truth. In The Rule of Metaplwr2 Paul Ricoeur elaborates upon the 
meaning of Heidegger's dictum: 
This saying suggests than the trans-gression of meta-phor and that of meta-physics are 
but one and the same transfer. Several things are implied here: first, that the ontology 
implicit in the entire rhetorical tradition is that of Western 'metaphysics' of the 
Platonic or neo-Piatonic type, where the soul is transported from the visible world to 
the invisible world; second that meta-phorical means transfer from the proper sense to 
the figurative sense; finally, that both transfers constitute one and the same Uber-
tragrmg .3 
171 
Religion, Literature and the Arts Project 
This sounded so important, and so convincing, when I was a seminarian, 
but now I wonder where to begin grounding the proposition. What does it 
really mean? 
The interrogations of Western metaphysics and language, the 
scapegoating of Athens, the equating of Christianity with the Greek mind, 
the perpetual blame laid at the feet of Enlightenment, these have gone about 
as far as they can go without becoming incredible. This is because, quite 
simply, a civilisation cannot be intrinsically annihilating, and the human 
person cannot be divided, simply because of reason, or language, simply 
because 'the cat sat on the mat' . 
In a recent volume of conference proceedings entitled Speculations 
after Freud, 4 it was unsettling to note that, while it was a conference on 
psychoanalysis, most papers published were delivered by university 
professors of philosophy, linguistics, literature and language. Only one 
paper was delivered by a psychologist, and he was a Jungian, not a medico. 
Apparently the conference did not attract professors from most of the 
humanities, or from theology, or medicine, or any of the sciences. This 
absence is telling, for it suggests that psychoanalysis (like literary theory) has 
become a kind of cul-de-sac that fewer and fewer intelligent people want to 
turn to, perhaps for good reason. 
Judging from the case studies presented, those academics who are 
trained in philosophy and linguistics are also psychoanalysing human 
subjects. As twentieth-century shamans and prophets they are using a 
Postmetaphysical methodology in order to reintegrate the human 
personality that is supposed to have been disintegrated, in one way or 
another by metaphysics and the Enlightenment. They each treat 
psychological illness as something characteristic of the Modern Western 
world, an illness that has its aetiology in Western thinking, Western 
language and Western religion, all condemned as 'logocentric'. 
As if crying out against this introspection (even though he ascribes to 
the mythology behind it), the influential Jungian analyst James Hillman has 
called for an end to analysis.s He himself has given up analytical practice 
upon realising that after a hundred years of therapy the world is getting 
worse. For Hillman the problem is that Western individuals have become 
'superconscious patients and analysts, very aware and very subtle 
interiorised individuals, and very unconscious citizens'.S In this context 
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analysis and therapy (even art therapy) cannot help because 'the patient 
cannot, definitely not, by definition not, become citizen so long as the model 
of the psyche which therapeutic analysis serves remains fixed where it is'.6 
For Hillman the real illness is in society not the individual, and so his 
cure involves recapturing a World Soul which has been killed off by the 
Enlightenment, and by Christianity. According to Hillman this killing 
articulated by ... Descartes, who called it res exte11sn. Out there, as well as 
everything in this room including our bodies, is just dead matter. Descartes, if not the 
1500 years of Christianity before him, killed off the world, turning it into soulless 
littered field. Descartes and the Christians invented litter and pollution, and 
shopping, too ... So long as we regard the world as external to therapy and the 
individual as the only place of consciousness, we may be practicing with the tools of 
Freud, but what we practice is the theory of Desca rtes. And the soul can't get out of 
analysis until it can get out of Cartesianism and, allow me to add, Christianism? 
There is a sinister aspect to Hillman's polemic that will be lost upon those 
religious artists and creators who have been busily using Jungianism to 
justify their holistic art-and-dance therapies. It is hard not to glean from 
Hillman's rhetoric that psychoanalysis will remain devoted forever to the 
erasure of metaphysics and Christianity, from the consciousness of the 
individual, and beyond that, from the Western polis. For Hillman, by 
definition one cannot be a good Christian, and a good citizen, and a whole 
person, as he clearly believes the three categories are mutually exclusive. 
If, for Hillman, the issue is a political one (and here I would agree with 
him, the issue is intensely political) then it becomes necessary for Christians 
to be wary of his battle cry and consider just how he proposes to overcome 
Christianity in the Western polis and replace it with his own superior and 
more integrated system of belief. How does he intend to recapture the 
World Soul without violating some basic, hard won and cherished human 
rights, without subverting the principles of freedom and democracy that 
come to us from the same Enlightenment which is supposed to be the 
source of all evil? 
What does all of this mean for the inter-disciplinary dialogue between 
Religion, Literature and the Arts? 
It means that as an inter-disciplinary dialogue it needs to be aware of 
the essentially political nature of interpretation. For the most part 
contemporary theory has been conducted as the expense of science, and of 
Western religion in general, and of Christianity in particular. This is a 
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political issue which ought to be addressed. While a lot of Postmetaphysical 
theory wants to appear open-minded, a lot of it has become a closed system, 
and the time has come to question the narrower aspects of its logic. 
We can acknowledge this without lapsing into a reactionary arch-
conservatism, because there really is quite a lot at stake. The challenge 
which confronts Religion, Literature and the Arts is a hermeneutical one. It 
is the challenge of creatively dealing with those inevitable prejudices that 
are a part of being human. It is the challenge to not be over confident about 
one's own broad-mindedness whilst always presuming upon the narrow-
mindedness of the other. It is the challenge of being truly creative, not 
merely repeating the of the age, or fighting solipsism with solipsism, 
or piling relflcation upon reification. It is the challenge of widening 
horizons, of keeping open the circle of dialogue between the creator, the 
interpreter and the text. 
Of course we can, and should, understand the meaning of the text and 
its textuality, in a variety of ways. In hermeneutics there is no totalised 
meaning and the Hermeneutical Circle ought to be ever widening. Being 
sensitive to this is paramount, as Religion, Literature and the Arts projects 
itself into the future, whilst never forgetting the wisdom of Ecclesiastes: 
there is nothing new under the sun. Everything that has, is, or will be said, 
by artist, writer and interpreter, has already been said. If this is true, then a 
lot of art and literature can be regarded as theology simply because it stands 
in a greater tradition that works and reworks what has already been said, 
according to the signs of the times. Those signs from different times inform 
a creative tradition that continues on - like Western religion - in spite of 
second-rate theory and psychoanalysis. The time has come to discard some 
of the shibboleths and solipsisms that surround contemporary 
theory, so that we can, as creators and interpreters, move on. 
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